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Introduction 
In December 2013, Temple University announced that they would be eliminating 
seven varsity sports from their athletic department.  Athletic Director Kevin Clark cited 
“tightening budgets, the need to get Title IX complaint, and the state of the university's 
facilities” as the main reasons that Temple had to discontinue the programs.1 Temple is not 
alone, as over time, many collegiate athletic departments have discontinued specific sports 
for various reasons. Oftentimes a department claims a need to ‘comply with Title IX 
regulation’, a federal legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender, as the 
primary reason for discontinuing an athletic program. In other cases, schools have cited a 
need to reduce athletic department spending. Regardless of the reason, discontinued 
programs generate a windfall of previously allocated funds to athletic departments. In the 
current study, I examine how expenses get reallocated within an athletic department 
following the discontinuation of an athletic team. In particular, I investigate whether funds 
are reallocated to the remaining sports or simply saved for other purposes. Furthermore, if 
the funds are reallocated, I investigate the manner in which these saved expenses get 
distributed to the remaining sports. 
This study attempts to answer these questions by examining what happens to the 
expenses of a team once an athletic department decides to discontinue an athletic program. 
Drawing from the consumer products industry, where companies often eliminate, sell off, 
or divest low-performing operating segments or product lines for strategic purposes, it is 
possible that universities decide to similarly terminate specific teams from their athletic 
                                                      
1 Menta, N. (2013, December 6). Temple to cut 7 athletic programs. Comcast SportsNet 
Philadelphia. Retrieved April 30, 2014, from http://www.csnphilly.com/ncaa/temple-cut-
7-athletic-programs 
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department in order to reallocate expenses to better performing units. When a company 
eliminates a particular segment of their organization, they are often motivated by profit 
maximization objectives. If one were to consider athletic departments in the same category 
as these companies, (both making decisions with profits in mind) it would be completely 
reasonable to expect their strategies to be consistent with each other. If an athletic 
department were to consider profit motives, it may be prudent to divest in low-profit areas. 
Smaller sports, such as tennis or wrestling, although not as expensive as football, still cost a 
substantial amount of money to fund each year. Unlike football though, these sports often 
do not generate significant revenue for the department, or university at large. Ticket sales 
and sport-specific merchandise for low-revenue producing sporting events often do not 
cover the associated costs of supporting these athletic programs. Thus, it would be 
practical for an athletic department to make the decision to cut one or more of these ‘low-
revenue-producing’ teams, and reallocate the saved expenses to teams that are more 
successful at bringing in revenue.   
Therefore, this study looks at the average growth rates of schools that have 
eliminated sport teams from their athletic department over the last several years. When 
looking at these growth rates, I was interested in whether or not there was any abnormal 
activity around the time of the sport team cut. Whether there was a sharp increase in 
expenses, or a noticeable decrease, this study attempts to determine how saved expenses 
are allocated post elimination. Were schools actually making cuts for their openly 
expressed rationale?    
The results of the research show that the treatment schools, which discontinued a 
sports team from their athletic department, are disproportionately reallocating their cost-
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savings to football. Furthermore, 1-year averages indicate that there was no discernable 
effect on the expenses of athletic departments one year after a cut was made. However, 
when evaluating the 3-year average results, it appears that schools are in fact 
redistributing their expenses unevenly towards football. The 3-year average growths for 
the football expenses of treatment schools were higher than the control groups in each test. 
Additionally, the 3-year football expense growths were higher than those of the lower-
revenue sports when compared to 2 of the 3 control groups, showing that football is in fact 
receiving more of the cost reallocation.  
 
Related Literature 
In the consumer products industry, there has been a recent trend to sell off, or 
‘divest’, one’s non-core brands. The thought process is that these companies want to focus 
their resources on core segments or higher margin products. By ‘shedding’ smaller, 
underperforming brands, companies can then focus their attention and allocate more 
resources to their core segments.2 Recently, the company ValueClick displayed this strategy 
by selling its ‘O&O’ segments. The company specified a need to focus more on its “core” and 
“high-margin” segments. By dropping its low-performing segments in order to invest more 
resources into its higher performing areas, ValueClick intends to spur “future growth.”3  
My theory is that this same thought process could be applied to collegiate athletic 
departments. Similar to firms divesting, or eliminating low performing segments, I expect 
                                                      
2 Divest and deliver. (2013). Retrieved from https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local 
Assets/Documents/MA/us_ma_Consumer Products selling-off brands POV_02262013.pdf 
 
3 Valueclick to divest o&o segment. (2013, december 16). Retrieved from 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/valueclick-divest-o-o-segment-212505917.html 
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that athletic departments are using their saved expenses to further fund the department’s 
core or higher-revenue generating sports. In many ways, a collegiate athletic department is 
similar to a business operating for profit. Just as a business is pressured to earn profits by 
its shareholders, collegiate athletic departments are pressured to generate income for the 
university. Seen by some as “corporate businesses that pay no taxes,” these sport 
departments also strive to bring in as much money as possible4.  Successful athletic 
departments generate volumes of publicity for their institutions, similar to how successful 
companies add to their brand. When a company provides a quality product or service, the 
reputation of that brand increases. This same logic can be applied to college athletic 
departments, as when a team succeeds on the field, the university gains acknowledgement. 
Moreover, there is always incentive for a department to succeed because when a 
department is winning, there is an increase in school spirit, which is often followed by an 
increase in donations from alumni and prominent school supporters5. 
 
Hypothesis  
As some athletic departments see specific sports ‘underperforming’, they drop those 
teams in order to use the saved expenses elsewhere.  Following a reduction in the number 
of athletic teams actively competing for the institution, I expect athletic departments to 
reallocate a disproportionate percentage of cost savings to high-revenue producing sports. 
As such, I test the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
 
                                                      
4 Woods, R. (2011). Social issues in sports. (2nd ed.). Retrieved from 
http://www.humankinetics.com/excerpts/excerpts/intercollegiate-athletic-programs-effect-on-university-
enrollment-fundraising 
5 Woods, R. 
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H: The percentage of total expenses allocated to the highest (lowest) revenue-generating sports will 
increase (decrease) following other sports being cut from the department.  
 
This was the case at Northeastern University, where the school came out and openly cited 
their reason for cutting specific teams as a need to “invest in signature strengths” such as 
hockey and basketball.6 Instead of explaining a need to comply with Title IX, or make 
budget cuts, Northeastern took a different approach and directly justified their 
discontinuations as a strategic move to prioritize their top revenue generating sports.  
It is also possible that we see the opposite effect on expenses. Perhaps when a 
department cuts a sport, the expenses of the other lower revenue-generating teams see a 
disproportionate increase in their expenses. It is also conceivable that no effect on 
expenses is detected at all. A department could discontinue a program, and just keep the 
saved expenses, causing there to be no measurable change.  
 
Research Design 
 In order to detect any abnormal growth rates in expenses per sport, this study has 
three group-sets of departments: one group consisting of all of the departments that have 
experienced a cut, one group consisting of departments that match in conference and size, 
and one group consisting of every college/university in the United States. Growth was 
calculated in expenses per year, per sport. Growth was computed in two ways, the first 
using a 3-year moving average, and the second using a simple one-year average.   
                                                      
6 Too costly, football done at northeastern. (2009, November 23). Retrieved from 
http://sports.espn.go.com/boston/ncf/news/story?id=4681701 
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To calculate a multi-year moving average, the following equation was used: 
Growth Rate= [(f/s)^(1/y)] – 1, where:  
• f = final value or expense 
• s = starting value or expense 
• y = number of years 
 
First, the final value was divided by the starting value. In this study, the three-year moving 
average is computed by taking the third year being observed, and dividing it by the first. 
For example, if there were 3 consecutive years of expenses of $400,000, $500,000, and 
$600,000, one would divide $600,000 by $400,000. Then, one would raise the quotient to 
the power of 1/y, which in this case is 1/3. One was subtracted from this answer to get the 
growth number. For the purpose of this study, the equation was: 
 Growth Rate = ((Year n+2 expense / Year n expense)^(1/3)-1)) 
The second growth rate used was a simple 1-year average growth. The equation for this 
growth was as follows: 
 Growth Rate = (Year n+1 expense- year n expense) / year n expense 
When compiling a team’s expenses over the years, I looked for any abnormal spikes 
in growth. When looking at the data, I expected to see a larger growth percentage a year or 
two after the sport cut took place. Nonetheless, it could be that the changes in expenses are 
just part of a normal growth pattern. In order to get a baseline on normal growth per sport, 
I compared each school that has experienced a cut, to a school of similar size in their 
conference. By doing so, I was able to better pinpoint whether or not that ‘spike’ could 
actually be attributed to the cut.  
In selecting the control group, I decided to use schools of the same conference, 
similar enrollment size, and comparable athletic department revenues. Conference was a 
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good measure of a similar athletic department because schools in the same conference are 
often located in relatively the same geographic location, and are of generally similar 
competition levels.  Competition level is important because schools of different conferences 
often spend different amounts on their sports. For example, a football team in the SEC 
(South Eastern Conference) is most likely going to spend more on their football team 
expenses than a team from the CAA (Colonial Athletic Association). Also, the size of the 
schools and athletic department revenue were used because schools of different sizes often 
have different levels of resources that they could use to pay for sports’ expenses. To find 
the control group, I went to the US Department of Education’s website. Here, schools were 
sortable by conference. After selecting the conference of the university that I was finding a 
match for, I then located the school that was closest in both enrollment size and athletic 
department revenue.  
The research consisted of three parts. First, all of the expenses per sport for each 
school in the group sets were collected. As described in the data section below, this was 
done by going to the US Department of Education’s website. Once the expenses were 
collected, the growth rates per sport were calculated, using the two different equations 
above. This left two numbers per sport, per school: the 3-year moving average growth rate, 
and the 1-year growth rate. Once the growth rates were compiled, the treatment group and 
three sets of controls for both the 3-year and 1-year rates were created. The treatment 
group was each school that experienced a cut in this sample period. For each year in the 
study (2001-2013), only the schools that had eliminated a sport in that year were selected, 
and their growth rates were averaged together. For example, in 2003, Drexel University, 
Canisius College, Fairfield University and St. Johns University all had a cut. So the growth 
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rate for each sport in 2003 was an average of these four schools’ rates. The first control 
group was the same as the treatment group, but with the matched schools instead of the 
schools whom made a cut. The second control group was compiled using the matched 
schools, as well as the treatment schools who did not have a cut that year. For example, in 
2003, the growth rates would be an average of the matched schools’ rates in addition to the 
all of the treatment schools’ rates not including the four schools above. Finally, the third 
control group consisted of the average rates of all the universities in the US. 
The third step in the process was to calculate the difference in growth rates between 
the treatment group, and each of the control groups. . It was feasible that during some 
years, large portions of the schools all saw an increase or decrease due to industry factors 
outside of our study. Hence, a year-by-year approach was taken, comparing each school to 
each other as well as the control population.  This method offset any patterns of either 
growth or decline that existed across all of college sports. Taking the difference by year 
ultimately accounts for any macroeconomic shocks.  
From here, the growth rate differences were averaged for each year to get one 
number per sport. Then the rates per sport were compiled into two groups: high revenue 
generating sports, and low revenue generating sports. A positive number in either group 
would indicate that the treatment schools are experiencing higher growth than the controls. 
A higher growth rate would suggest that schools that cut a sport are seeing their expenses 
rise at a faster pace, and hence, reallocating more money to the remaining teams. Also, a 
higher number for the high revenue generating sports in comparison to the low revenue 
sports would show that sports such as football and basketball are receiving a greater 
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proportion of the cost savings in comparison to smaller sports such as swimming, baseball, 
etc.  
 
Data 
 The schools selected for this study were all Division 1 universities that had 
experienced some type of cut in their athletic department from the 2000-2013. Schools 
were selected using various Google searches. I did find a few articles that included several 
schools each, but to my knowledge, no all-inclusive list of schools that have made cuts 
existed.  
Expenses for these schools were obtained through the U.S. Department of 
Education’s website, using their “Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool.” The data 
dates back to the 2000-2001 school year, as limited by the U.S. Department of Education’s 
website. Schools are responsible for reporting their numbers directly to the agency. 
However, there is no reason to suspect that the schools in treatment would bias their 
numbers differently from non-treated schools. Therefore, it was assumed that the expenses 
and revenues provided to the website are accurate. 7 
 
Results 
 The results for the 3-year and 1-year average growth rates were somewhat varied. 
When looking at the 1-year growth rates, the treatment group generally had lower growth 
                                                      
7 It must be noted that each growth rate calculated that exceeded 1, or 100%, was changed 
to 0. There were rates that reached 500%+. Because it cannot be determined whether or 
not these rates were the result of human submission error, I changed any rate above 100%. 
Also, it can be noted that the same tests were conducted with each exceeded growth rate 
changed to 1 instead of 0. The results were of the same quantitative value, confirming the 
outcome.  
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rates for both the high and low-revenue generating sports in comparison to the control 
groups. 
Differences in 1-Year Growth Rates 
 
Treatment vs. 
Matched Control 
Group 
Treatment vs. 
Matched + 
Remaining 
Treatment 
Treatment vs. 
Universe Control 
Group 
High Revenue 
(Football and 
Basketball) 
-0.184% 
 
-0.283% 
 
-0.114% 
 
Low Revenue (all 
others) 
0.096% 
 
-0.155% 
 
-1.183% 
 
High Revenue 
(Football) 
0.541% 
 
0.243% 
 
0.670% 
 
Low Revenue (all 
others) 
0.033% 
 
-0.195% 
 
-1.170% 
 
 
As seen above, I created two groups of high revenue sports. In one, I included the 
top two revenue-generating sports for colleges in the US. However, because football is 
substantially more profitable than basketball, I decided to make a second group with just 
football. When looking at the ‘just football’ numbers, there is a small increase in growth 
rates in comparison to all three control groups.  
Moreover, the 3-year growth rates have slightly different results. The fact that every 
situation yielded a positive percentage demonstrates that treatment group had a higher 
percentage growth than the control. Hence, treatment schools were reallocating more 
money towards their remaining sports. When the high revenue group consisted of both 
basketball and football, it grew at a lower rate than the low revenue group in all three 
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control situations. Still, when isolated alone, football grew at a higher rate than the low 
revenue groups in two out of the three control situations.8 
Differences in 3-Year Growth Rates 
 Treatment vs. 
Matched Control 
Group 
Treatment vs. 
Matched + 
Remaining 
Treatment 
Treatment vs. 
Universe Control 
Group 
High Revenue 
(Football and 
Basketball) 
0.156% 
 
5.375% 
 
0.014% 
 
Low Revenue (all 
others) 
0.567% 
 
5.573% 
 
0.309% 
 
High Revenue 
(Football) 
1.060% 
 
5.231% 
 
0.770% 
 
Low Revenue (all 
others) 
0.480% 
 
5.569% 
 
0.250% 
 
 
Robustness 
 One of the factors to be considered when designing the study was how to determine 
the average growth rate. I chose to use both a 3-year moving average growth and a 1-year 
simple average growth. With a multi-year average, I was able to see any true spikes in 
growth and it allowed for smoothing out any changes. With a 3-year average growth, I 
could see if schools delayed the allocation of their cost savings. It is practical that a school 
could cut a sport, and wait a year or two to redistribute the savings to the remaining sports. 
A school may be able to immediately redistribute variable costs that were saved from a cut, 
but some fixed expenses may take longer to become available. With a 3-year average, any 
delays in reallocation could be accounted for.  
                                                      
8 Because our treatment sample size was only 30, our results are not irrefutable. Future 
research should be done with a larger sample size to help validate the conclusions this 
study came to. 
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Limitations 
 Due to the low number of observations in this study, several factors were not 
considered in the research. For example, the study did not parse the sample by the reason 
given for each department’s discontinuation. There was a wide array of explanations that 
schools gave as to why they decided to make their cuts. Between Title IX compliance, 
budget constraints, facility restrictions and conference elements, schools described their 
rationale in different ways. If the sample size of this study were larger, the research could 
have been broken down into categories, separated by reason for the cut. Additionally, given 
the restraints of both the sample size and data availability, this study was not able to 
examine the role of gender in relation to these discontinuations. Future research can be 
done relating to the gender of the sport team cut, and its effect on cost-savings reallocation.   
 
Discussion 
It appears that schools are in fact reallocating their saved expenses, but taking a few 
years to do so. I do not detect positive differences in growth between the treatment and 
controls after only one year. However, I do see a positive difference in all situations when 
looking at the 3-year averages. Perhaps institutions are taking a year or two after a cut to 
reallocate those saved expenses. As discussed in the ‘Robustness’ section of this paper, it is 
completely feasible that a school may not redistribute the cost savings from elimination for 
at least a year after the elimination was made. Some of the fixed costs associated with the 
sport cut may take some time to come off the books. It is likewise possible that schools are 
either holding onto the savings for some time before reallocating, or spreading out the 
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savings over a few years. In either case, these reallocations of the saved expenses would 
show up in a 3-year growth average, rather than the 1-year average, which is measuring 
just the one-year growth after the cut.  
In examining the high/low revenue generating sport breakdown of results, I can see 
that clearly football is receiving a greater percentage of the cost savings. For the 1-year 
growth rates, football is growing at a greater percentage than all of the other sports. But 
because most of the rates are less than the control groups, we cannot attribute the greater 
percentage to a disproportionate reallocation. The fact that the control rates are higher 
than the treatment rates in general would mean that there likely isn’t a reallocation at all. 
In this case, schools are probably just spending more money on football than they are on 
other sports.  
However, when isolating the 3-year average growths, this greater percentage 
becomes more significant. Because all of the differences are positive, it can be said that 
schools that make a cut are taking the saved expenses and then reallocating them to the 
remaining sports, causing these schools to have a higher growth percentage. Of the sports 
receiving these saved expenses, it would appear that the highest revenue generating sport, 
football, is receiving a disproportionate percentage.    
When comparing football to the rest of the sports, it grew at a higher rate in two of 
the three control situations. Football’s expense growth rate difference from the matched 
control group was 1.06%, while the lower revenue generating sports had a difference of 
0.48%. Subsequently, when compared to the entire collegiate population, football’s growth 
rates were 0.77% higher, while the lower percentage sports were only 0.25% higher.  
 
 
15
These percentages may not seem significant at 1.06% and .77%, but when we are dealing 
with millions of dollars, these percentages equate to substantial amounts.9  
 
Conclusion 
 The results indicate that football teams are receiving a disproportionate amount of 
the cost-savings that result when a sport is terminated from a department. Consider how 
the collegiate football team’s average revenue in 2013 was just less than three times that of 
basketball ($3,061,739.85 vs. $1,115,030.96).10 When seeing the discrepancy between 
football’s revenue generating power, and that of the next highest grossing sport, basketball, 
it is very understandable as to why schools might be allocating their savings this way. If a 
company had both a profitable segment similar to football, and segments that lost money 
such as fencing and tennis, it would be completely practical for that company to divest in 
the poorly performing segments. Essentially, this is what some college athletic departments 
are doing. In order to maximize profit, these schools are discontinuing poorly performing 
segments, and reinvesting the cost-savings in their highest grossing areas. Although certain 
departments may be cutting sports to truly comply with Title IX regulation, or to meet a 
particular budget limit, it is clear that others are simply practicing a profit maximization 
strategy.  
 
 
                                                      
9 1.06% of the average football expense in the treatment group for 2013 would equate to 
$102,767 
10 Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool Website. (n.d.). Equity in Athletics Data 
Analysis Cutting Tool Website. Retrieved April 29, 2014, from http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/ 
 
 
Comment [JS1]: Perhaps you can quantify 
these amounts, rather than just saying 
‘substantial’. 
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Appendix 1                                                       Cincinnati Example 
 
3-Year Growth Rates Per Sport 
Sport 
2001-
2003 
2002-
2004 
2003-
2005 
2004-
2006 
2005-
2007 
2006-
2008 
2007-
2009 
2008-
2010 
2009-
20011 
2010-
2012 
2011-
2013 
Football 9.22% 3.97% -0.77% 6.32% 3.17% 5.39% 10.63% 8.11% 1.94% 2.78% 13.87% 
Baseball 3.33% 14.53% 5.47% 11.41% 3.96% -3.55% 0.59% 7.57% 4.09% 4.79% 9.09% 
Soccer 5.73% 10.19% 3.58% 6.11% 9.20% 9.72% 4.42% 2.65% 0.12% 4.12% 7.79% 
Swimming 5.56% 4.99% -4.98% 4.80% 9.49% 1.10% -2.44% 4.21% -2.14% -4.39% 0.67% 
 
 
Sport Average of four periods before cut Cut Average of four periods after cut 
Football 3.53% 10.63% 6.67% 
Baseball 4.32% 0.59% 6.39% 
Soccer 7.15% 4.42% 3.67% 
Swimming 2.60% -2.44% -0.41% 
 
 
Above are two tables consisting of 3-year growths rates for different sports at the University of 
Cincinnati. The first table is a simple year-by-year breakdown of the growth percentages by 
sport. In the second table, the growth rates are broken down into three columns. The first is 
the average of the growth rates four periods before the sport was eliminated from the program. 
The second column is the growth rate average from the year of the cut, and the third column is 
the average of the growth rates four periods after.  
 
The University of Cincinnati is an example of a school that seemed to disproportionately 
reallocate their cost savings towards their highest revenue generating sport, football. 
Cincinnati made the decision to eliminate the women’s rowing team from their athletic 
program at the end of the 2006-2007 school year. Citing a strain on the budget program, the 
move removed rowing expenses, which were last reported at $623,366. Looking at the table 
above, it would appear that a disproportionate amount of the saved expenses were reallocated 
to the football team. During the four periods leading up to the cut, the football team had an 
average 3-year growth of 3.53%. After the cut was made, that growth percentage increased 
substantially to 10.63%, and then declined down to 6.67% after the cut. When looking at low-
revenue generating sports such as baseball, soccer and swimming, we see a different effect. 
Growth rates for these sports actually decreased after the elimination of the rowing team.
Cut was made 
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Table 1: University Comparisons  
 Conference School Enrollment Total School’s Match Enrollment Total 
CAA Delaware 16,639 29,207,394 Old Dominion 14,883 36,929,483 
Big East Rutgers 29,928 71,851,419 UConn 16,587 63,374,981 
Pac-12 Washington  26,193 85,072,886 UCLA 27,365 83,926,720 
MAC Ball State 15,594 22,644,535 Western Michigan 16,228 25,458,301 
MAC Ohio U 16,855 27,265,061 Western Michigan 16,228 25,458,301 
ACC Clemson 15,570 68,163,948 Georgia Tech 13,190 63,630,964 
Big East Cincinnati  19,615 45,065,244 Pittsburgh 17,223 57,606,235 
Pac-12 Stanford 16,999 90,490,234 USC 17,497 97,802,24 
Missouri Valley Indiana State 8,669 11,685,797 Western Illinois 9,161 11,894,172 
Atlantic-10 UMass 20,177 28,659,514 VCU 19,511 25,749,624 
America East Maine 7,477 16,930,269 Maryland-BC 9,357 13,243,292 
Horizon League Cleveland State 8,472 11,290,814 Loyola-Chicago 8,793 12,508,656 
Horizon League Detroit Mercy 2,239 15,320,679 Valparaiso 2,830 13,665,267 
CAA Drexel 13,061 21,014,774 Northeastern 13,107 24,678,519 
Atlantic 10 Duquesne  5,640 16,498,821 Xavier 4,065 17,631,245 
Missouri Valley Northern Iowa 9,635 14,623,381 Youngstown State 9,795 13,632,988 
Summit League South Dakota 4,597 10,291,561 Missouri-KC 6,792 12,505,432 
America East Vermont 9,803 16,889,595 Maryland-BC 9,357 13,243,292 
MAAC Canisius  2,930 10,968,595 Niagara 2,799 9,467,780 
Atlantic Sun ETSU 10,175 10,331,210 North Florida 10,200 9,379,425 
MAAC Fairfield 3,456 16,559,155 Loyola Maryland 3,871 17,116,223 
CAA Hofstra 6,359 19,490,463 William and Mary 6,091 20,494,594 
MAAC Iona 2,924 10,563,647 Siena 3,035 12,448,673 
Atlantic 10 La Salle 3,553 13,011,972 St. Joes 4,424 17,732,229 
CAA Northeastern 13,107 24,678,519 URI 11,841 23,167,551 
Big East St. Johns 10,844 27,182,921 DePaul 13,627 25,343,254 
WCC St. Mary’s 2,776 14,166,984 Portland 3,320 12,917,933 
MAAC Saint Peter’s 1,895 6,865,794 Manhattan 3,141 9,873,118 
MAAC Siena 3,035 12,448,673 Marist 4,760 12,206,989 
CAA James Madison 17,302 36,072,842 
 
Old Dominion 14,883 36,929,483 
 
(Enrollment and Revenue Source: http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/) 
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Table 2: University Reason for Sport Elimination 
School Year 
of Cut 
Publically 
Stated Reason 
Link 
Delaware 2011 Title IX http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/sports/02gender.h
tml 
Rutgers 2007 Budget ‘shortfall’ http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2519938 
Washington  2009 Budget ‘cuts’ http://seattletimes.com/html/sports/2009157966_budget
cuts02.html 
Ball State 2004 Reduce expenses http://www.nwitimes.com/sports/college/ball-state-to-
eliminate-men-s-cross-country-track-
teams/article_d47d42a4-67ff-581d-a028-
7ff0397e112e.html 
Ohio U 2007 Title IX, expenses http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2007/01/ohio-university-
drops-four-sports.html 
Clemson Phase 
out 
2010-
2012 
Facility 
Restrictions 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5152852 
Cincinnati  2007 Budget ‘cuts’ http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2008/01/end-of-road-for-
cincinnati-rowing.html 
Stanford 2009 Budget ‘cuts’ http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/columns/story?id=43141
95 
Indiana State 2010 Budget ‘cuts’ http://www.tribstar.com/local/x1155810323/ISU-cuts-
women-s-men-s-tennis/print 
UMass 2002 Title IX, Save 
expenses 
http://www.umassathletics.com/sports/m-itrack/spec-
rel/031102aaa.html 
Maine 2009 Budget ‘challenges’ http://mainecampus.com/2009/04/13/volleyball-and-
mens-soccer-part-of-budget-cuts-for-2009/ 
Cleveland State 2011 Facility reasons http://www.cleveland.com/sports/csu/index.ssf/2011/05
/cleveland_state_university_dro.html 
Detroit Mercy 2004 Budget ‘cuts’ http://archives.commons.udmercy.edu/2013/04/05/take-
me-out-to-the-ball-game-university-of-detroit-baseball-
team-1895-2004/ 
Drexel 2003 ‘strategic move to 
remain in 
alignment with 
conference” 
http://articles.philly.com/2003-05-
17/sports/25460008_1_drexel-athletic-director-drexel-
university-eric-zillmer 
Duquesne  2010 Budget ‘cuts’ http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4858124 
Northern Iowa 2009 Budget ‘cuts’ http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=3928837 
South Dakota 2004 Focus on women’s 
sports 
http://www.keloland.com/newsdetail.cfm/usd-cuts-
baseball-new-focus-on-womens-athletics/?id=31140 
Vermont 2009 Financial gap http://www.vermontcynic.com/2.12544/uvm-to-cut-
baseball-softball-teams-1.1742208#.Uwd79PRdV9U 
Canisius  2003 Budget ‘cuts’ http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1298&dat=2002
1115&id=7C0zAAAAIBAJ&sjid=RggGAAAAIBAJ&pg=5041,3
898812 
ETSU 2003 Financial 
constraints  
http://www.tricities.com/news/article_ce89e002-f00d-
511c-b925-51c72e667577.html?mode=jqm 
Fairfield 2003 More money for 
financial aid 
http://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/Fairfi
eld-Cuts-Football-Hockey-Teams-755456.php 
Hofstra 2010 Cost and waning 
interest 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/sports/ncaafootbal
l/04hofstra.html 
Iona 2009 Dissolution of http://www.icgaels.com/ViewArticle.dbml?SPSID=64397&
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conference, lack of 
opponents 
SPID=7109&DB_OEM_ID=14900&ATCLID=3619985  
La Salle 2008 Lack of opponents http://articles.philly.com/2007-11-
20/sports/25223996_1_football-program-college-football-
scholarship-program 
Northeastern 2010 Invest in signature 
strengths 
http://sports.espn.go.com/boston/ncf/news/story?id=468
1701 
St. Johns 2003 Title IX, fairness http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/14/sports/colleges-st-
john-s-cites-fairness-in-cutting-5-men-s-teams.html 
St. Marys 2007 Strengthen other 
sports 
http://www.stmarys-ca.edu/saint-marys-college-
discontinues-intercollegiate-football-will-strengthen-
overall-athletic-program 
Saint Peter’s 2007 Conference 
changes, facilities 
http://www.championshipsubdivisionnews.com/log/index
.php/2008/10/16/football-programs-a-dying-breed-at-
small?blog=2 
Siena 2004 Conference 
changes 
http://www.championshipsubdivisionnews.com/log/index
.php/2008/10/16/football-programs-a-dying-breed-at-
small?blog=2 
James Madison 2007 Title IX http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/other/20
07-04-19-title-ix-jmu-cover_N.htm 
 
 
Table 3: Full Results 
 
1-Year Average Growth 
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3-Year Moving Average Growth
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